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PREFATORY REMARKS  
ON DRAFT PAPER 
 
This the paper that I submit to the 2006 Summer School in 
Göteborg; and the following prefatory remarks are written as a 
reader’s guide to what is more the point of departure for my 
Ph.D. thesis than an actual paper. This owes itself to the fact 
that I have only been a Ph.D. scholar since April 1st of this year. 
 
I have included a number of chapters with no actual contents 
but instead a short description of what they will contain when 
written sometime in the future. This is done so as to give the 
reader an idea of the structure in the thesis and thus also the 
author’s overall chain of reasoning. 
 
The symbol ‘#’ can be found on numerous pages of the paper 
and simply denotes a missing source or a point as of yet not 
completely written. I have tried to limit the presence of these 
flaws in the paper but plenty still remain, and you should 
disregard these. 
 
Chapter 2.1 is of lesser importance compared to the remaining 
ones, but is included to provide the reasoning behind my 
research design as elaborated in Chapter 2.2. 
 
On a final note, the paper almost exclusively deals with only 
one of the two problematiques that my thesis eventually will 
cover, i.e. resource allocation (the second being service 
adaptation). 
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On Geppetto and the Pinocchios 
”If politics is regarded as a conflict over whose 
preferences are to prevail in the determination 
of policy, then the budget records the outcome 
of this struggle”, 
# Wildavsky, 1986: 9. 
#Use quote from Pinocchio 
o quote Wildavsky, budgeting is the life blood of 
government and in his words, the budget provides us with 
the annals of the great battle for the pieces of the societal pie – 
or in Lasswell’s terms: the political struggle for who gets what, 
when and how (#). But much can be said for instead referring 
to both budget and government in plural, as citizens from all 
parts of the world daily are confronted with a bewildering array 
of public authorities that enjoy more or less autonomy from 
their respective Capitol Hills; talk of the budget in singular 
therefore seems ill guided, at best. This is surely true of the 
case under investigation here – Denmark, if not generally: 
Scandinavia – where local authorities account for the torso, 
arms as well as the legs of the welfare state, figuratively 
speaking – and that quite irrespective of how we may try to 
measure it. But without the head, the body is of little use, and 
this is where capitol hill enters the picture; in metaphorical 
terms, the structure of the Danish public sector is one of a 
plethora of more or less autonomous Pinocchios, until recent 
times 282 counties and municipalities but now 103, and one 
Geppetto, the state, with a lot of strings to keep track of – and 
disentangle if things should go awry. Expressed in different 
terms, a decentralized system presupposes the marriage of two 
very different logics often at odds with each other: that of 
centrally held macroeconomic responsibility, Geppetto’s 
unceasing worrying for his wooden son, with local autonomy 
and local accountability, the easy-living Pinocchio unceasingly 
T
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trying to break free from the strings that constrain him1. This is 
potentially a recipe for trouble, and as we shall see, very much 
validates Allison’s claim that where you stand depends on 
where you sit (Allison & Zelikow, 1999) – which in this case 
means either behind a desk on capitol hill or in a town or 
county council farther from the pinnacles of power. But 
perhaps this view is a bit too antagonistic: metaphorically 
speaking, the relationship between the aforementioned can 
probably better be understood as similar to the Confucian 
concept of yin and yang: as complementary opposites 
(Wikipedia, 2006); that is, a necessary and also beneficial 
antagonism. Furthermore (as also elaborated in later chapters), 
although each depends on the other, their interests, concerns 
and so forth are neither in perfect overlap nor mutually 
exclusive – but rather somewhere in between2. The discrepancy 
between these two logics (or lack thereof) is the point that this 
thesis pivots around, which brings me to its subject matter. 
The fundamental structure sketched out above seems a 
fair representation of both the past (at least post-1970), present 
and future Denmark, albeit she recently was subjected to strong 
winds of change – winds instigated by a slim parliamentary 
majority in the summer of 2004. After a long night of wheeling 
and dealing in the Ministry of # (#find newspaper article), 
Denmark woke up to the second complete remapping of her 
                                      
1
 An example on the presence of the latter but absence of the former is 
that of the regional authorities in Brazil in the #late 1990s and the 
troubled waters that this course left for the then incumbent Government 
(#). 
2
 Or expressed by way of familiar examples from the world of 
economics: this situation is not one of win-win, the example par 
excellence of one such being free trade as propagated by the writings of 
Adam Smith and David Ricardo (or put game-theoretically: a plus-sum 
situation. However, it is also not win-lose as in protectionist measures as 
propagated by List and his writings on infant industries (do.: a zero-sum 
situation). 
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communal landscape in the relatively short span of just four 
decades. What happens when a decentralized system like the 
Danish is subjected to fundamental reform? That is the subject 
matter of this thesis, more specifically the winds of change that 
the current local government reform will usher in for all 
concerned parties at both central and local levels. As Ejersbo 
has noticed, when it comes to reform efforts, large as small, 
“[t]he typical picture is one of great uncertainty about what the 
result of a reform will be. And the larger the reform, the larger 
also the uncertainty… Reforms are rarely as rational and clear 
as the promoters of reform pretend them to be – on the 
contrary… Generally speaking, our knowledge and ability to 
comprehend reforms and their effects is far from as 
comprehensive as the impression given in connection with the 
launching of the reforms”. 
(freely translated from Ejersbo, 2005). 
Then, uncertainty seems to be the keyword as for the effects of 
the reform currently underway in Denmark, and lots of it given 
its size and scope! This is further compounded by our lack of 
knowledge about the previous local government reform, which 
received only scant attention scholarly back in the 1960s and 
70s. This very much makes the thesis a journey into uncharted 
waters albeit navigation is eased well underway by the 
knowledge that does exist on the matter, theoretically and 
empirically. This leads us to the specific questions that the 
thesis will try to provide answers for. 
1.1 MACROCHANGE AND MICROBEHAVIOR – OR: 
STRATEGIZING IN THE LARGE AND THE SMALL3 
Although fundamentally different from its predecessor in a 
number of respects, this second local government reform has 
also had communal amalgamation at its centre which brings us 
to the first part of this thesis’ explanandum: the municipalities’ 
                                      
3
 The terms used in this caption are similar to those of Schelling (#). 
Page 4 
and counties’ financial behaviour in the time leading up to the 
local government reform. Specifically, 234 of the current 268 
municipalities will be amalgamated into 64 new ones, leaving 
34 unaffected and giving a total of 98 new ones per 01.01.2007; 
furthermore, the 14 current counties will be amalgamated into 5 
new regions4.  
When the higher powers engage in the sport of heresthetics 
(Riker, 1986) 5 , tinkering with the rules of the game and 
limiting future admittance to the table (specially to a 103 local 
authorities plus the government), then the players denied access 
can be expected to behave very differently from those that 
aren’t. Stated in different terms, heading for the dustbin of has-
beens can lead to decidedly myopic and short-sighted 
behaviour in spite of its longer-term consequences. Conversely, 
those who retain their seat at the table should not experience 
such a displacement, because they can expect to see the 
morning sun for the many days to come. In contrast to its forty-
year-old likewise bourgeois predecessor, the incumbent 
government has been all too aware of these ‘perverse’ 
incentives, and has instigated various countermeasures to 
circumscribe any such financial wholesale in ‘the locals’. 
Regardless of the effects of these considerations, I forward the 
following problematique for theoretical deliberation and 
empirical investigation: 
Problematique A: does the municipalities’ and counties’ 
financial behaviour stand out in the period leading up to the 
second local government reform – and if so then why? 
As will be explicated in later chapters, the measuring rod for 
‘standing out’ will be both temporal and spatial. The 
                                      
4
 Three local authorities are designated as both municipalities and 
counties, i.e. Copenhagen, Frederiksberg (which is encapsulated by the 
first-mentioned) and Bornholm. 
5
 Or ’strategizing in the large’ if one will (Shepsle & Bonchek, 1997). 
The definition of heresthetics is # (#Riker). 
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problematique thus focuses on the new municipalities’ and 
counties’ financial standing at their moment of (re-)birth; and 
this thesis will try to answer how sound that foundation will be 
in addition to why. 
This brings us to the second part of the explanandum: the 
local government reform’s implications for the service 
provision in the new 103 local authorities, both during its 
implementation as well as afterwards. As likewise explicated in 
later chapters, there are several reasons why we should expect 
to see higher service provisions (and expenditures) in those 
new authorities that are formed on the basis of amalgamations; 
that is, a convergence towards the highest common 
denominator among the groups of amalgamating authorities. 
Conversely, the incumbent government and several of its 
predecessors have for a number of years preached as well as 
practiced fiscal restraint at all levels in the public sector – even 
more so in recent years; this speaks in favour of expecting a 
convergence towards the lowest common denominator among 
the amalgamating authorities. Disregarding the effects of these 
considerations, the second problematique thus focuses on the 
reform’s implications for the new authorities’ expenditure 
levels, be they intended, unintended or perhaps unforeseen: 
Problematique B: will the second local government reform 
affect the levels of service provision and thus expenditures in 
the municipalities and counties – and if so then why? 
Although distinct in their own right, the common 
denominator between these two problematiques is that they 
both concern financial issues in the new local authorities. 
Expressed in a single sentence (and admittedly, somewhat 
pessimistically), we might with good reasons fear that the new 
amalgamated authorities will be poorer and more expensive 
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compared to their predecessors; and that is the concern that this 
thesis will try to substantiate or put to rest6. 
1.2 ON CHOICE OF THEORY 
As the old saying goes for the bride to be, she should dress in 
something old, something blue, something borrowed, 
something new. Apart from the third accessory, this platitude is 
a fair representation of the author’s theoretical standpoint 
which stresses eclecticism, although retaining a theoretical core 
as the common denominator: that of game theory. This stance 
is easily justified for although much can be said for staying 
within a single, well-defined theoretical framework, taking a 
more pluralistic stance arguably alleviates thinking ‘outside the 
box’ – and thus letting one’s own imagination set the 
theoretical boundaries instead of having those prescribed to you 
via the imaginations of other scholars in the field. Returning to 
the core that will take on the role of theoretical common 
denominator, game theory (as utilized in collective action 
theory): this increasingly popular branch within positive 
political theory can be said to highlight factors not particular to 
a given subject matter, i.e. its contextual, sui generis properties; 
instead, it highlights the ‘decontextualized’ elements that often 
are quite endemic to human agency in general, i.e. “elemental 
conflicts” (Poundstone, 1992). This is where some people err 
(though quite understandably) when they think of game theory 
more as a formalizing tool than an actual theory; for that it is 
albeit analyzing something as general as the number of players 
or the order in which the choose, might very well seem 
atheoretical. Furthermore, this thesis is more outcome- than 
process-oriented, so to speak, focusing less on modelling and 
understanding the bargaining processes in the subject matter, 
and more on the resultants of those negotiations. However, one 
must, if not always then often, include aspects of the former to 
                                      
6
 or in the great tradition of the social sciences: perhaps a bit of both. 
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understand how the latter have come about – and this I 
therefore do. 
1.3 THE BIRD’S EYE VIEW: EXAMINED CAUSALITIES 
Future content: a verbal and graphical overview of the 
causalities examined in the thesis, along with the specific 
hypotheses forwarded for empirical investigation. 
1.4 CONCLUSIONS 
Future content: the conclusions of the thesis. 
1.5 ON MATTERS OF FORM 
Future content: various comments, for example that all citations 
from interviews have been translated freely by the author, and 
so forth. Also, I refer to all sections as chapters, i.e. Chapter 5, 
Chapter 5.1, Chapter 5.3.1 etc. 
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I. METHOD, DATA & THEORY 
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2 MATTERS OF METHOD AND DATA 
his chapter takes its point of departure in outlining the 
ontological and epistemological weltanschauung of the 
thesis, and then proceeds to explicate its research design. Next 
follows an account of the subject matter: the Danish public 
sector from its past, over its present and (near-)future. Finally, 
the first part is concluded by an examination of the theoretical 
common denominator between the two problematiques, 
whereas their additional, unique aspects are treated separately 
in later chapters. 
2.1 BALANCING ACT: FINDING COMMON GROUND 
BETWEEN PARSIMONY AND CONTEXTUAL NOISE 
“Each [theory] begins [its] analysis from a 
particular assumption that determines the kind 
of question that they ask, and therefore the 
answer they find. They are like … toy trains on 
separate tracks, travelling from different 
starting-points and ending at different 
(predetermined) destinations, and never 
crossing each other’s path”,  
(Strange, 1994). 
Unlike most of her academic cousins, the social sciences 
concern themselves with relations among humans, and that 
regardless of the various disciplines’ and schools’ differing 
areas of interest (economics, politics…), levels of analysis 
(individuals, organizations, states…) and so forth. Furthermore, 
just as we all were told in kindergarten that each and everyone 
of us was something special, likewise has every man-made 
event its very own element of sui generis, its peculiar 
circumstances and idiosyncratic aspects. However, I venture 
the assertion that the social sciences generally is less concerned 
with this ever-present contextuality, on the contrary; expressed 
in the well-known terms of set theory, we are mostly interested 
T
Page 10 
in an event’s intersection with something else, whatever that 
may be (Morrow, 1994) – that is, those patterns and tendencies 
that can be registered across a range of select events along a 
temporal and/or spatial dimension. If we in this way view 
reality as black and white, then we can say that where the 
humanistic historian posits that everyone is a product of their 
own time (‘time’ interpreted rather broadly), the social scientist 
conversely tries to see the wood for the trees (1998; Kurrild-
Klitgaard, 1996; Stoker, 1995). Despite how unreasonable this 
stereotypical world view might seem, it still reflects a classical 
weltanschauung in the social sciences – one that typically is 
accredited Friedman and his assertion, that 
”[a] hypothesis is important if it “explains” much by little, that 
is, if it abstracts the common and crucial elements from the 
mass of complex and detailed circumstances surrounding the 
phenomena to be explained and permits valid predictions on 
the basis of them alone. To be important, therefore, a 
hypothesis must be descriptively false in its assumptions; it 
takes account of, and accounts for, none of the many other 
attendant circumstances, since its very success shows them to 
be irrelevant for the phenomena to be explained”, 
(Friedman, 1953). 
Focus this viewpoint is on the subject matter’s intersection (or: 
common denominator) with something else, ‘the common and 
crucial elements’, rather than the historian’s ‘mass of complex 
and detailed circumstances surrounding the phenomena’ (see 
also Morton, 1999). This parsimonious weltanschauung has 
over time gained a secure foothold in the social sciences and so 
has ceteris paribus assumptions, i.e. assuming that all other 
things are equal (Morton, 1999). But this should not blind us 
from the fact that this is true any theoretical stance! (Stoker, 
1995)(# King et al, 1994: 49). Gone are the days where social 
scientists believed that they could (and should) capture the 
entirety of reality in a single theory from their ivory towers – 
although Marx, for instance, indeed gave it a good try (Strange, 
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1994). The point is that ones choice of ‘toy train’ in Strange’s 
words, prescribes both how (epistemologically and 
methodologically), what and where we analyse (ontologically), 
in addition to informing us as to why; this renders theory a 
selective enterprise, choosing inter alia level(s), event(s) and 
actor(s) ex ante to analysis; or as one professor from the 
author’s institute elegantly put it: “theory is the differences, 
that you think make a difference” (Nørgaard, 2006). Illustrating 
the point by way of example, King et al express it in the 
following manner: 
“[C]onsider a six-inch toy model of an airplane made of 
plastic and glue. This model is a small fraction of the size of 
the real airplane, has no moving parts, cannot fly, and has no 
contents. None of us would confuse this model with the real 
thing… The key feature of a real airplane that this model 
abstracts is its shape. For some purposes, this is certainly one 
of the right features. Of course, this model misses myriad 
details about an airplane, including size, color, the feeling of 
being on the plane, strength of its various parts, number of 
seats on board, power of its engines, fabric of the seat 
cushions, and electrical, air, plumbing, and numerous other 
critical systems. If we wished to understand these aspects of 
the plane, we would need an entirely different set of models”, 
# King et al (1994) pp 49. 
What you choose to focus on obviously depends on your 
subject matter. This necessity for a toy train or plane to keep us 
en route was also emphasized gracefully by the aforementioned 
professor, for as he remarked, “everything affects everything, 
trust me!” (Nørgaard, 2006) Then, as noted earlier, no single 
theory can explain everything – or expressed in the oft-used 
terms of statistics: we can never expect our models to explain 
all of the variance in the dependent variable7; and even if we 
did achieve this, then is should give grounds for concern and 
                                      
7
 a point that critics of the parsimonious perspective often seem to 
overlook (for example, see #). 
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not jubilation on the part of the scientist. So there will (and 
ought) always be unexplained variance, or ‘noise’, in our 
models8. In continuance hereof lies the fact that theories should 
not simply be viewed as in competition with each other, but 
also as complementary (perhaps as complementary opposites 
like that of yin and yang, as mentioned in Chapter 0 on page 2). 
This point is elegantly captured in a well-known animal 
metaphor usually accredited Puchala: 
“Several blind men approached an elephant and each touched 
the animal in an effort to discover what the beast looked like. 
Each blind man, however, touched a different part of the large 
animal, and each concluded that the elephant had the 
appearance of the part he had touched. Hence, the blind man 
who felt the animal's trunk concluded that an elephant must be 
tall and slender, while his fellow who touched the beast's ear 
concluded that an elephant must be oblong and flat. Others of 
course reached different conclusions. The total result was that 
no man arrived at a very accurate description of the elephant. 
Yet, each man had gained enough evidence from his own 
experience to disbelieve his fellows and to maintain a lively 
debate about the nature of the beast”, 
(Puchala, 1972). 
If anything, this fact is a standing invitation for inter alia 
eclecticism and also methodological pluralism, but for the 
present the point is a different one, namely that ones choice of 
theoretical lens necessarily to some extent predetermines ones 
findings (for example, see Rosamond, 2000). This innate 
element of tautology in any theory should not be slighted, for in 
Stoker’s words, we do not only choose which trees to look at in 
                                      
8Nothing condescending is intended by the term ’noise’ which derives 
its meaning from a statistical perspective; it denotes unexplained 
variance that cannot be accounted for by the ‘common and crucial 
elements’, in Friedman’s words (from page 10), but instead stems from 
the ‘mass of complex and detailed circumstances surrounding the 
phenomena’. 
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the forest, our ontological worldview, but also how we look at 
them, our epistemological weltanschauung. Looking for and 
finding what we perhaps hope to find can make it hard to retain 
the baby while exposing of the bathwater. One must therefore 
also keep in mind what one isn’t looking for; as the 
aforementioned professor similarly asserted, reality does not 
simply talk back but provides you only with answers for the 
questions that you choose to ask it (Nørgaard, 2006).  
 Everything is relative, as Einstein often is (wrongfully) 
quoted for having said, and this is likewise the consequence of 
theory’s tautological nature – this because our findings come to 
depend heavily (if not exclusively) on our choice of measuring 
rod; for example, what we find to be large, bright or right very 
much depends on how we define small, dark and wrong. This 
touches on the cautioning words of Demsetz (1969) not to 
succumb to a nirvana assumption, which Rothstein elucidates 
in the following manner:  
“Representatives of the one side compare the ideal picture of 
the market or state with its actually existing opposite; 
unsurprisingly, the result is given from the start”, 
(Rothstein, 1998). 
For example, the expanding use in recent years of 
benchmarking within the public sector provides authorities with 
a measuring rod on performance that is based on so-called ‘best 
practice’; rather than having central authorities lay down more 
or less well-informed or arbitrary goals, it can be argued that 
best practice provides authorities with ones that already have 
been achieved by others and thus, so the logic goes, are 
generally achievable (#)9.  
                                      
9
 For example, how well child-care is handled in one municipality thus 
becomes a question of its quality elsewhere, and not on the judgement of 
the Ministry of the Interior and Health; of these two, the former 
measuring rod surely seems the more reasonable one. 
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 This raises the further issue of variation in our dependent 
variable(s), for as explicated above, what is large, dark or 
wrong derives its meaning from what is small, bright and right; 
and as the previously cited professor noted on this matter, 
variation is something that you actively create (Nørgaard, 
2006); your choice of ‘opposite’ then becomes your measuring 
rod. #. 
 As previously noted, everything affects everything (at 
least potentially) and this also reveals the great distance that 
lies between the softer, more tendency-prone social sciences 
and the harder natural sciences, that work less in relatives and 
more in absolutes. Although one can easily be charmed by the 
thought of conducting social scientific inquiry as Pavlov did 
with dogs (and B. F. Skinner with infants), this would be to 
build castles in the air (#source on behaviourism); for as 
Strange adamantly warns us, 
“[t]he ambition in the social sciences to imitate the natural 
sciences and to discover and elaborate ‘laws’…, is and always 
has been a wild goose chase”, 
(Strange, 1994). 
Then, endeavouring into the wheeling and dealings of (wo)man 
only rarely produces evidence that is either-or; instead, it is 
almost always a bit of both and will probably continue to be so 
until the squaring of the circle10. # 
Enter the contextual ‘noise’. Viewing the world in terms 
of black and white as done so far is stretching it a bit – actually 
a lot – and does not give due credit to the social sciences; for 
the contextual cannot singularly be relegated to the realm of the 
                                      
10But as the saying goes, no rule is without its exceptions, and there a 
some examples of near-laws in the social sciences: in the study of 
international politics, it is more or less a established fact that 
democracies do not wage war against other democracies (#); and in 
electoral research, ‘first past the post’ systems do tend to create stable 
two-party system, as Duverger asserted (#; #). 
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historian, far from it! Relying on parsimony and ceteris paribus 
assumptions might be one of the great fads of our time, but as 
for example Mørch notes, it is only in the realm of economic 
theory that ‘all other things’ ever are equal (2004)11. The point 
is that one should recognize the folly of painting too simple a 
picture of one’s subject matter, and instead try to incorporate 
some of the contextual ‘noise’ that is so readily assumed away 
in the name of parsimony. This brings us to the issue of method 
and one of the longest running quarrels with the social 
sciences: that of positivism against relativism; as Devine notes, 
”The use of qualitative methods is tied to a specific 
epistemological position. Issues of method therefore raise the 
long-standing debate between positivists and relativists about 
the similarities and differences of methodology between the 
natural and social sciences… Quantitative methods, for 
example, are closely associated with a positivist 
epistemological position… [P]ositivists have been concerned 
                                      
11
 My own favourite example on the importance of contextual ‘noise’ is 
also drawn from Mørch and his description of the late social democrat 
Hans Hedtoft, who was Prime Minister to Denmark in 1947-50 and 
again from 1953 until his sudden and unexpected death in 1955. In 1950, 
he effectively handed power over to the liberals on a plate following a 
relatively harmless inquiry on the removal of the butter rationing then in 
effect; it was said that he ‘slipped in the butter’. As Mørch notes, that 
such a peripheral issue was taken as a lack confidence in the government 
had a great deal to do with something very personal and idiosyncratic to 
Hedtoft himself: that of his wife, Ella, who was terminally ill; for on the 
morning of his last day in office, “[h]e sat alone in the Prime Minister’s 
Department with an untouched packed lunch in from of him – and wept. 
He had spent the last three nights beside Ella’s sickbed and did not have 
strength for any more” (2001). If anything, this example shows us the 
potential effect of the purely idiosyncratic and contextual on something 
as severe as the life and death of an entire government. Conversely, the 
fall of Hedtoft’s first term as Prime Minister is by # portrayed as the 
consequence of a #structural/general characteristic (#). It is left up to 
reader to make up his own mind whether the latter has flushed the baby 
out with the bathwater, or not. 
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with the precise operationalisation and measurement of 
theoretical concepts… [For relativists] the emphasis is not on 
making predictions about behaviour but rather on seeking to 
capture the uniqueness of human experiences…”, 
(Devine, 1995). 
However, despite that this stereotypical assertion is widely 
known within the social sciences, it seems to emphasize the 
competitiveness between different methods too vehemently 
over their complementarity (Dahler-Larsen, 2002; see also 
Hellevik, 2002); as for instance Maxwell notes: 
”Qualitative and quantitative methods are not simply different 
ways of doing the same thing, Instead, they have different 
strengths and logics and are often used to address different 
questions and purposes. The strengths of qualitative research 
derive primarily from its inductive approach, its focus on 
specific situations or people, and its emphasis on words rather 
than numbers”, 
(Maxwell, 1996). 
The defence for methodological pluralism can easily be 
illustrated by way of example: in Maxwell’s words, numbers 
(read: quantitative data and techniques) can be utilized for, say, 
questions about what an assumed maximizer has achieved. 
Conversely, words (do. qualitative) can be used for questions 
about why it was achieved and thus provide a test of whether 
that person actually has acted as a maximizer in the first place. 
Pluralism allows us in this way to analyze not only whether our 
expectations hold up, but also the assumptions that those 
expectations were based on; the latter aspect thus makes 
analytically endogenous what would otherwise have been held 
exogenous. Or put in the familiar terms of statistics: causation 
is a matter of theory, not measurement (#). In sum, it thus 
seems more prudent to choose the happy medium of utilizing 
different data and techniques for different purposes – as 
opposed to following the stipulations of a particular paradigm 
and staying on its propagated narrow(er) path to righteousness. 
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This brings us to the research design of the thesis, to which I 
now turn. 
2.2 RESEARCH DESIGN: IN SEARCH OF THE BABY AND 
THE BATHWATER 
As accounted for in the preceding chapter, quantitative as well 
as qualitative data and techniques are utilized in the search for 
answers to the questions of what, where, when, how, and why. 
As likewise noted previously, variation in your dependent 
variable is something that you actively create, and group 
(a)symmetry (among the amalgamating authorities) is a 
potentially important issue in relation to both problematiques. 
Both the quantitative and qualitative analyses will therefore not 
confine themselves to the level of the individual authorities but 
also incorporate group characteristics. 
Regarding the quantitative data and techniques, they are 
firstly performed at the level of the individual municipalities 
and counties on a number of select financial variables freely 
available for 2005-2008/200912. The first problematique (A) on 
resource allocation will contain data on the use of accumulated 
liquidity, near-liquid assets (sales of buildings, land and so 
forth), expenditures on buildings and similar, as well as 
borrowing. Secondly, various group measures on symmetry 
among the amalgamating authorities are introduced, i.e. 
measures of variation (range standard deviation, coefficient of 
variation etc.); these measures pertain to the aforementioned 
financial variables. 
As for the second problematique (B) on service 
adaptation, I have not made my mind up at this point in time; 
                                      
12
 These variables will primarily be drawn from the authorities’ budgets 
and not their accounts. However, data from the latter should become 
available for 2005, 2006 and possibly 2007 within the deadline of the 
thesis (March 2009); these will of course be included, just as the 
discrepancies between the authorities’ budgeted and actual behaviour 
will be analyzed. 
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however, the analyses will obviously include service levels and 
expenditures – or instead of the latter: generally on the running 
costs in the authorities. Again, both individual measures and 
group measures on symmetry are utilized. 
 As for the qualitative data and techniques, I have over the 
last two months conducted two exploratory interviews with 
three more planned in the late summer (and possibly a fourth at 
a later time); they have more been open-ended conversations 
than actual interviews and have served as a testing ground for 
my various ideas and thoughts on the problematiques. Come 
fall I will begin a series of more systematic, in-depth (!) 
interviews (circa of an hours duration each) that will be 
repeated in 2007, 2008 and possibly in the beginning of 2009. 
The size of the sample will be around 20-30 interviews (per 
annum) and case selection based on stratification along a 
number of factors: whether a municipality is amalgamated or 
not, political re-election and financial variables (low/high 
accumulated liquidity, service levels and so forth). So much for 
the horizontal scope of the sample. Vertically, I will try to 
interview both a high-ranking politician (mayor) and official 
(CEO) in each authority, so the number of represented 
municipalities will be around 10-15 (per annum). 
 
 
 
Page 19 
3 THE PAST, PRESENT AND PROSPECTIVE PUBLIC 
SECTOR IN DENMARK 
his chapter will start off by describing the structure of the 
Danish public sector its overall evolution from the past to 
the present and (near-)future. #. 
3.1 WHERE YOU STAND, DEPENDS ON WHERE  
YOU SIT! 
“The right of municipalities to manage their 
own affairs independently, under State 
supervision, shall be laid down by statute”, 
§ 82 in the Danish Constitution of 1953 
(Folketinget, 1999). 
Future content: this chapter is only two pages long at the 
present but I have included those pages as they are a vital part 
in the theoretical chain of reasoning that follows in later 
chapters. 
As the caption cites Allison for having said (as well as in 
Chapter 0 on page 2), it is not unreasonable to expect that one’s 
concerns, interests and so forth very much are shaped by 
whether you sit behind a desk on capitol hill, partaking in the 
life of Geppetto, or in one of the Pinocchios’ town or county 
councils farther from the pinnacles of central power13. If local 
authorities merely were a provincial extension of central 
government (as is the case in France; #), then it would arguably 
be more meaningful to examine the relationship between 
different levels of government as a principal-agent problem (#) 
– rather than as a situation of strategic interaction between 
independent parties. However, Danish local authorities do 
enjoy autonomy from their capitol hill, indeed it is (at least 
                                      
13
 The literature on this matter is quite extensive and does also not 
pertain to a single field. For example, see #Brunsson, CCI etc. 
T
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their de jure existence) constitutionally secured as cited 
above14. As Christensen et al notes on the matter: 
“The municipalities [and counties, I might add] are a part of 
the public administration and as such subordinate to 
Parliament. At the same time, the town [and county] councils 
are elected and therefore accountable to the local voters”, 
(freely translated from Christensen et al., 1999). 
So although part of the same public administration, their tasks 
are not the same though each necessary for the other – or in the 
words of the Introduction (on page 2): they are complementary 
opposites as that of yin and yang. This touches on their 
accountability which likewise differs between the two – a point 
that for instance the Danish Economic Council have 
emphasized: 
“The Government will by the voters be held responsible for 
the overall economic development while the local politicians 
normally are judged by other criteria, for example communal 
taxes or the service level”, 
(freely translated from Økonomiske Råd, 2002). 
This means that each has to cater for different concerns and 
interests in the electorate – indeed their respective electorates 
really aren’t the same, the local authorities’ being a subset of 
the Government’s; and their performance is thus also measured 
on different matters Mr. and Mrs. John Q Taxpayer. Take the 
case of the local authorities: on the face of it, their overall 
expenditure levels (child-care, road maintenance and so forth) 
are of course the end result of a vast number of decisions made 
within numerous areas, as Pallesen sensibly notes (2003); in 
this sense, the life of the Pinocchios seems quite similar to that 
of Geppetto. But the former obviously only caters to its own 
electorate, and as one scholar notes: 
                                      
14
 The de facto scope of their independence, however, is another story 
and treated in the next chapter. 
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”What counts for the individual town [or county] council is 
not the economy in general. It is particularly considerations 
for the municipality [or county, in my opinion] and its 
economy. If you can get away with not paying then you do so 
gladly”, 
(freely translated from Andersen, 2000b). 
Actually, one might even say that local authorities are required 
by law only to consider the concerns of their respective local 
populations (read: electorate) – at least when no legal 
provisions exist that state otherwise; for as Andersen, writes: 
”Whether the municipalities [or counties] can act without legal 
authority depends on the purpose of the task. The service must 
exclusively benefit the local community[, however]”, 
(Andersen, 2000a; cursive omitted). 
#. 
3.2 BACK TO THE FUTURE? THE TEMPORAL TUG-OF-
WAR BETWEEN GEPPETTO AND THE PINOCCHIOS  
“Starting in 1970, Denmark completed the 
most comprehensive modification of the 
political-administrative system since the 
constitution [of 1953]”, 
(freely translated from Bogason, 1997). 
 
”Denmark is at the present engaged in the 
implementation of what has been called the 
largest reform ever of the [Danish] public 
sector”, 
(freely translated from Ejersbo, 2005)15. 
Future content: a descriptive chapter on the evolution of the 
Danish public sector, i.e. decentralization along a temporal 
dimension (taxes and expenditures) and comparatively 
(compared to a number of other OECD counties). The size of 
                                      
15
 See also #Mouritzen, 2004: 9. 
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the public sector over time will also be analyzed, possibly also 
comparatively. Additionally, the quantitative and qualitative 
aspects of the Danish local authorities will also be described, 
both over time as well as comparatively. 
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4 THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION AND 
’COOPERATIVE MAN’  
his chapter contains the theoretical common denominator 
that exists between the two problematiques. However, it 
firstly delves into various theoretical issues related to the 
theoretical common denominator in the thesis, namely game 
theory. 
4.1 ON THE STRAW MAN HOMO OECONOMICUS 
Future content: reviews and provides a defence for a key 
assumption: rationality. 
4.2 THE SCIENCE ON SCIENCE REVISITED: TENETS OF 
GAME THEORY 
Future content: this chapter will expand on the earlier remarks 
from Chapter 2.1 by explicating the central tenets of game 
theory and what this means in terms of assumptions. 
4.3 IN BETWEEN HOBBES AND ROUSSEAU: 
PRECONDITIONS FOR ’COOPERATIVE MAN’ 
“In such condition, there is no place for 
Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain; 
and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no 
Navigation, nor use of the commodities that 
may be imported by Sea; no commodious 
Building; no Instruments of moving, and 
removing such things as require much force; no 
Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account 
of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and 
which is worst of all, continuall feare, and 
danger of violent death; And the life of man, 
solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short”, 
(Hobbes, 2002). 
T
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Future content: this chapter will elaborate the necessary 
conditions for collective action, namely that cooperation by 
achievable (which is not the case in the Hobbesian state of 
nature qua the pure ‘egoism’) as well as fruitful (which is not 
the case in the Rosseauan state of nature qua the general will, 
i.e. the pure ‘altruism’). 
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II. CONFLICTS OVER  
THE COFFERS 
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5 GAME OVER? THE SHADOW OF THE FUTURE 
AND THE 2ND LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORM 
A brief, introductory note: this chapter has so far only been 
worded to account for one financial variable in relation to 
resource allocation, namely consumption of accumulated 
liquidity. However, as earlier noted (on page 17), there are 
additional variables that will be included at a later time; these 
are near-liquid assets (sales of buildings, land and so forth), 
expenditures on buildings and similar, and borrowing. 
 Also, the game-theoretic element is as of now very slim, 
which is reflected in the formulated hypotheses that pertain to 
the local authorities’ (linearly calculated) payoff functions and 
not the collective outcomes of their actions. 
Having reviewed the restrictions that have been imposed on the 
local authorities by the powers at be – and thereby also their 
financial liberty of action until 1st January 2007 – it is now time 
to ask what this leads us to expect of their behaviour. In what 
follows, the theoretical chain of reasoning proceeds stepwise as 
is the custom within positive political theory; for as Hovi notes: 
”When constructing formal models in general, and especially 
within game theory, it is an established principle that one 
should start by studying a (perhaps strongly) simplified case, 
and then make stepwise expansions in the direction of more 
realistic models. In practice, this means that the researcher 
deliberately utilizes very stringent and unrealistic assumptions 
as point of departure”, 
(freely translated from Hovi, 1992). 
The latter remark is completely congruent with the thesis’ 
weltanschauung as explicated in Chapter 2.1 (on page 10), and 
serves at least two purposes: firstly, proceeding step by step 
clarifies the chain of reasoning from the perspective of both the 
recipient and the sender, that is, the reader as well as the author. 
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Secondly, one is given the opportunity to examine different 
aspects of the problematique from various viewpoints and 
against varying measuring rods 16 , all theoretically founded. 
Developing your theoretical reasoning step by step and 
forwarding increasingly complex hypotheses thus also holds 
value from an empirical perspective. I will comment further on 
this in the course of the analysis. 
5.1 THE SHADOW OF THE PAST: LEVIATHAN HARD AT 
WORK 
As elaborated in Chapter 3.2 (on page#ff), the Danish local 
landscape stands today before its second major reshuffling in 
the short span of just four decades; and at the centre of both its 
predecessor and the current reform stands the amalgamation of 
local authorities. Also, there has in the years preceding each 
reform been a considerable amount of uneasiness about 
‘uneconomical conduct’ on the part of the local authorities (#); 
so let us begin by turning back the clock to Thursday January 
1st 1970: the time spent in preparation of that reform was 
considerably longer than the present one (commencing in 1956) 
just as the time span of the amalgamations also was 
considerably longer (starting in 1962) 17 . But the then (also 
bourgeois) government took few precautionary actions against 
any uneconomical conduct in the local authorities: 
”By the first communal amalgamations there was not yet made 
sufficient financial safeguards in the conditions for the use of 
accumulated liquidity, which led to strange overconsumptions 
                                      
16
 or stated in the Puchala’s terms (from Chapter # page #): different 
parts of the same elephant. 
17
 Then, preparations and planning spanned fourteen years in the 1970 
reform held up against two-and-a-half years in the present one (if the 
work of the Commission on Administrative Structure is omitted).  
Likewise, the amalgamation period spanned eight years in the former 
compared to a mere # years in the latter. 
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with the purpose of securing that the money benefited the 
original population”, 
(freely translated from Asmussen, 2003). 
Although there then were made to systematic, scholarly 
investigations into the scope of these ‘strange 
overconsumptions’, they seem to have been widespread, as 
several have noted (for example, see Olsen & Kommunernes 
Landsforening, 2004). One of the more wellknown and tragi-
comic examples was that of the 1962 amalgamation of Marstal 
rural parish with Marstal trade post (located on a small island in 
southern Denmark): 
”Marstal trade post was… [geographically speaking] 
completely enclosed by Marstal rural parish… [and when] the 
annexation board had made their principal decision [to 
amalgamate the two] and set out the terms for the annexation, 
then the parish council decided to use all of its accumulated 
liquidity (around 100.000 kroner) on some quite superfluous 
street lighting that only lid up the parish – the urban areas of 
the municipality as well as the actual rural districts. The trade 
post lay still in darkness… Wayfarers from Ærøskøbing [, 
containing the island’s main sea port,] were thus met by a 
‘neon sea’ in the middle of the country road which continued 
into the urban areas but which stopped by the old city 
boundary. From then on you drove into the dark streets of the 
city”, 
Strøm, 1991a: 86, 8718. 
Perhaps inspired by this hard-earned, historical lesson, the 
present Government was quick to introduce measures against 
any uneconomical conduct in the local authorities – actually 
introducing them already before the Commission on 
Administrative Structure publicised its report (on the necessity 
and feasibility of a local government reform in the first place). 
                                      
18
 #Check quote. 
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On December 22nd 2003 the Government and the National 
Association of Municipalities jointly requested that 
”…the town councils throughout the country carefully 
considered the appropriateness of initiating construction 
projects. At the same time the municipalities were asked to 
report all construction appropriations over 1 mn kroner to the 
Ministry of the Interior and Health with a view to continually 
following developments in activity”, 
#refman: Finansministeriet, 2004a: 12;  
(see also Folketinget, 2004). 
This approval scheme was thought as a direct precautionary 
measure in connection with a reform at a later time, for  
”The Minister of the Interior and Health has between 
Christmas and New Year’s eve stated that the government is 
very eager to avoid, that considerations on amalgamations 
give rise to additional expenditures not provided for in the 
budgets, financed by drawing on accumulated liquidity. There 
were numerous examples of this in connection with the 1970 
reform and thus should not be repeated in connection with any 
potential, new reform”, 
(freely translated from Olsen & Kommunernes Landsforening, 
2004). 
The scheme was in effect for the fiscal years 2004 and 2005 (#; 
(Finansministeriet, 2004) and the subsequent countermeasures 
have been in direct continuation of this measure (Indenrigs- og 
Sundhedsministeriet, 2006b). It was for the fiscal year 2006 
replaced by Law no. 540 (Folketinget, 2005a) and departmental 
orders 1462 and 1466, which limited the restrictions to local 
authorities that were to be amalgamated (Indenrigs- og 
Sundhedsministeriet, 2005b; Indenrigs- og 
Sundhedsministeriet, 2005a); however, it was at the same time 
expanded from covering only constructions  to include all 
operations as well, expenditures as well as revenues (Indenrigs- 
og Sundhedsministeriet, 2006b). Furthermore, power of 
approval was with few exceptions decentralized from the 
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Ministry of the Interior and Health to integration and 
preparation committees (one for each group of amalgamating 
municipalities and counties, respectively), composed of the 
town and county councillors for the new amalgamated, 
authorities (as elected in the November 16th 2005 elections; #); 
but let us for the present renege this processual aspect as it will 
be dealt with in detail later in Chapter 5.5. 
 In addition to this was Law no. 549 (Folketinget, 2005b) 
which added several further restrictions for the fiscal year 
2006, respectively on consumption of accumulated liquidity in 
addition to restrictions on taxation and tax bases, the latter both 
for income revenue, land tax and reimbursement duties 
(Folketinget, 2005b); apart from the first-mentioned these 
restrictions applied equally to both the municipalities and 
counties. Especially interesting for the present matter is the 
compulsory depositing of surplus liquidity, in effect from 
01.10.2005 until 01.01.2007, whose purpose partially concerns 
the fiscal year 2005 but also is in place to “…support 
appropriate financial behaviour in the transitional period 
leading up to the local government reform (freely translated 
from Kommunernes Landsforening & Regeringen, 2005; see 
also the explanatory memorandum for Folketinget, 2005c). 
 The picture that heretofore emerges on the first and 
second local government reform is one of striking contrast as 
both municipalities and counties almost literally have been tied 
by hand and foot in the latter. This indubitably owes itself to 
centrally held fears of behaviour along the lines of carpe diem 
in the local authorities; that is, that they might choose to live 
for the present (read: today) and not the morrow. 
 But how are we to define uneconomical conduct? For 
now I offer quite a wide understanding of the concept as  
”...arrangements made by the existing municipalities and 
counties that directly or indirectly can affect the possible 
arrangements of future municipalities and regions, and where 
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these arrangements would not have been made or would have 
had a different content, provided the new units had had power 
of authority”, 
(freely translated from Indenrigs- og Sundhedsministeriet, 
2006b). 
Having answered this question, then the next is to ask whether 
these restrictions afford the municipalities and counties any 
leeway in their financial arrangements – and the answer is in 
the affirmative. However, I have yet to elaborate the actual 
extent of their scope and its specifics. 
5.2 FIRST THINGS FIRST: THE EFFECTS OF 
AMALGAMATION 
“When you surround an army, leave an outlet 
free. [This does not mean that the enemy is to 
be allowed to escape. The object, as Tu Mu 
puts it, is "to make him believe that there is a 
road to safety, and thus prevent his fighting 
with the courage of despair." Tu Mu adds 
pleasantly: "After that, you may crush him."]”, 
Sun Tzu’s Art of War, 6. årh. f.Kr.  
(Tzu & Giles, 1910). 
As Sun Tzu is cited for above, you should always give your 
enemy the impression of having an outlet (but nothing more) 
when surrounding him (or her, of course); otherwise, s/he will 
fight with the courage of despair. A lot of water has passed 
under the bridge since these words were uttered but Sun Tzu’s 
point finds renewed use in the present context. The point with 
the quote is not that Danish local authorities were laid under 
siege by the local government reform – there is little doubt of 
that in the minds of most knowledgeable people within the 
field. No, the point is instead well-captured in the old proverb 
that what the goodwife spares the cat eats, for this is the effect 
of the reform on a large subset of ‘the locals’. Stated in other 
terms, the municipalities and counties can with good reason 
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wish to provide against a rainy day, say, if one of the 
authority’s larger, labour-intensive enterprises should choose to 
outsource production to more easterly skies. But how much is 
the cash in the coffer (read: accumulated liquidity) worth when 
you will cease to exist (per 01.01.2007)? Presumably not much! 
Clearly, there are strong incentives for financial drainage in the 
amalgamating authorities. The imminent demise of the great 
majority of municipalities and counties thus means that their 
shadow of the future, the longer-term consequences of their 
present actions, becomes a decidedly sunny affair – or in the 
words of Sun Tzu: they can be expected to fight with the 
courage of despair for there is no tomorrow for them. In the 
realm of game theory, such temporal effects on actor payoffs 
are called discount factors, δi, i denoting the local authorities 
numerical designation19 ; further, δi is assumed to lie in the 
interval i0 δ 1≤ ≤
20
. Given a constant discount factor and 
                                      
19
 i.e. i = (101, 147, … , 861) = (Copenhagen, Frederiksberg, … , Aars)  
for the old municipalities and i = (1013, 1014, … , 1080) = 
(Copenhagen, Frederiksberg, … , North Jutland) for the old counties, 
designated ‘regions’ in the new division (Kort & Matrikelstyrelsen, 
2004b; Kort & Matrikelstyrelsen, 2004a; Amtsrådsforeningen, 2001). As 
noted in footnote 4 (on page 4), Copenhagen, Frederiksberg and 
Bornholm have status as both municipalities and region, which is why 
they enter into both numerical denominations. 
20
 The concept is thus based on the (admittedly somewhat pessimistic) 
assumption that time only can have a negative impact on actor payoffs – 
or at best: no effect (Morrow, 1994). The two logical extremes 
respectively indicate ’perfect’ patience (δi = 1) and ’perfect’ impatience 
(δi = 0), the former because the payoff remains unchanged over time, 
that is, no discounting takes place; in the latter case, the payoff is 
reduced to zero after just one stage which in, say, a bargaining situation 
amounts to uttering the ultimatum that ‘it’s now or never’ (Hovi, 1998; 
Tarar, 2001). 
 The assumption that time only can have a negative, or no, effect on 
actors payoffs owes itself to a lot of the literature that occupies itself 
with discounting. An obvious scholar is Rubinstein and his assertion that 
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identical time intervals, then actor i’s payoff Pi in round n is 
calculated as ni iδ P  (Morrow, 1994; see also Osborne, 2004)21. It 
seems reasonable to assume that the amalgamating authorities 
are ‘perfectly’ impatient with a discount factor equal to zero, so 
that their accumulated liquidity only has value for them before 
01.01.2007 and thereafter becomes worthless22. Conversely, the 
authorities that are not affected by amalgamation, here our 
relative measuring rod, are arguably ‘perfectly’ patient with a 
discount factor of 1, as there is no theoretical grounds for 
expecting otherwise; this amounts to assuming that the benefits 
of having a certain amount of accumulated liquidity is equally 
large after 01.01.2007 as before, which seems quite a sensible 
expectation.  
 This gives us a model with a bivariat, unidirectional and 
positive causal connection where consumption of liquidity is 
the dependent variable, Ci, and amalgamation the independent, 
dichotomously coded as δi = {0, 1} = {No, Yes}; discount 
factors are thus simply aligned with whether the authorities are 
to be amalgamated or not; see Figure 1 below. 
 
Figure 1: Consumption of Liquidity and Amalgamation 
Given the restrictions that have been imposed on the local 
authorities cf. Chapter 5.4 (page 39ff), we have to understand 
the expected consumption of liquidity, Ci, relative to the 
possible consumption, Pi, which is calculated as total liquid 
                                                                                                         
the negative impact of time owes itself to rising transaction costs; the 
sooner you reach an agreement, the cheaper it is for all involved parties. 
21
 #Demonstrate by way of example and show that discounting is 
calculated not unlike compound interests. 
22
 I am as of now unsure whether the analysis on resource allocation 
should be confined to the fiscal year of 2006 or also include 2004-05. 
Exploratory interview data suggest the former but I leave it an open 
question for now. 
Page 34 
assets per 31.12.2005, Ai, subtracted the required deposition of 
surplus liquidity (cf. page #), Di, that is, 
 i i iP A D= −  (6.1). 
The expected consumption of liquidity can then be calculated 
as  
 ( )i i i i i iC P A D= δ = δ −  (6.2), 
that is, status as amalgamating authority or not multiplied by 
the (highest) possible consumption of liquidity. The 
expectation is therefore simply that amalgamating authorities, 
δi = 1, will consume as much of their liquidity as possible 
within the imposed restrictions, i.e. i i iC 1 P P= ⋅ = . Conversely, 
the authorities unaffected by amalgamation, δi = 1, are expected 
to consume nil, i.e. 0 0i iL M= ⋅ = . 
 The reasoning so far has solely defined the variation in 
the dependent variable, consumption of liquidity, along a 
spatial dimension; that is, across the local authorities depending 
on whether they are amalgamated or not. However, one can just 
as easily understand the chain of reasoning in combination with 
a temporal dimension, which gives us quite a different 
measuring rod: instead of simply comparing the amalgamating 
authorities with those that are left unaffected, the consumption 
of liquidity in each type of authority can be compared at two 
points in time, before 01.01.2007, Ct÷1, and after, Ct. From this 
viewpoint, we should expect consumption of liquidity to be 
higher at the latter point in time relative to the former, that is, 
 
t t 1
i i i iC C
÷δ > δ  (6.3). 
That amalgamation is included in the inequality owes itself to 
the fact that the argument only holds up for the amalgamating 
authorities, δi = 1, so that the expectation is that 
t t 1 t t 1
i i i i1 C 1 C C C
÷ ÷
⋅ > ⋅ ⇔ > . Conversely, there is no expectation 
as to any temporal difference in the liquidity consumption of 
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the remaining authorities, δi = 0, which leads to the non-
sensical expectation that t t 1i i0 C 0 C 0 0
÷
⋅ > ⋅ ⇔ > . 
 The next question that begs answering is how to define 
the two points in time, t and t ÷ 1? As already discussed in 
footnote 22 (on page 33), the former is defined as the fiscal 
year of 2006. As for the latter, I have as of now not decided on 
how to define it; but I am thinking about using an average 
measure for the five preceding fiscal years prior to 2006, that is 
average consumption of liquidity from 2001 to 2005. 
 To sum it up, the behavioural expectations set out above 
can be expressed verbally as 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): for the fiscal year of 2006, the 
consumption of liquidity in the amalgamating local authorities 
is firstly expected to be as high as possible within the frames 
of the centrally imposed restrictions on consumption. 
Conversely, the consumption in the remaining, unaffected 
authorities is expected to be nil. Secondly, it is also expected 
that the amalgamating authorities’ consumption is higher in 
the fiscal year of 2006 compared to that of previous years. 
Then, there is a double yardstick at work here, spatial as well as 
temporal. However, the question is whether we in Stoker’s 
words are looking at the right two trees in the forest (two as the 
preceding model was bivariat)? Although providing theoretical 
grounds for empirically examining consumption of liquidity 
along the dividing line of amalgamation23 , it is nonetheless 
based on a too unrealistic depiction of the problematique; and 
albeit that can be a useful starting point, as Hovi was cited for 
previously (on page 26), it is no more than that: a point of 
departure. Also, despite Friedman’s previously cited assertion, 
that a hypothesis must be descriptively false in its assumptions 
to be important (see page 10), the baby seems so far to be 
getting the same treatment as the bathwater. 
                                      
23
 Recall the second purpose of proceeding step by step as mentioned on 
page 42. 
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5.3 OPENING UP THE BLACK BOX: THE EFFECT OF RE-
ELECTION 
The problem heretofore is that the chain of reasoning has been 
based on the fallacious assumption, that a municipality simply 
is a municipality, and a county simply a county. In other words, 
they have all been assumed out of the analysis as an 
undifferentiated and exogenously given size. Such unitary actor 
assumptions are very common in political science (for example, 
see Allison & Zelikow, 1999), but holds beyond actually a near 
universal prevalence – if for no other reason than to make an 
otherwise incomprehensibly complex world more tangible 
(Berger & Luckmann, 1983); the point is illustrated: just pick 
up a given newspaper on a given day and you will find a dozen 
examples of how a given school, municipality, county, 
enterprise or nation is said to have done this or that; however, it 
is people who make decisions, not faceless entities. The point 
in the present context is that it is not the local authorities per se 
that make decisions, but rather the duly elected town and 
county councillors of those entities that act on its behalf (with 
all the vices and virtues that collective action entails, of 
course). Then, it is councillor re-election and not authority 
amalgamation that should have an impact on the consumption 
of liquidity – as thus also function as our relative measuring 
rod. The literature on the subject of rent-seeking politics is 
quite extensive24, and for the present the point is that re-elected 
local politicians from the amalgamating authorities can be 
expected to try to counteract any spendthrift emptying of their 
respective town or county coffer(s); the reason is quite simply 
to try to secure a sound financial standing for the new authority 
in which they are a part as a councillor. Conversely, not re-
elected politicians (purposefully or not, it makes no difference) 
have no such longer-term incentives and should therefore take 
                                      
24
 #review of literature. 
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on the role of spendthrifts25. I forward that the consumption of 
liquidity can be expected as a function of re-election, Ri, in two 
ways: firstly, as a function of whether a given amalgamating 
authority’s mayor is re-elected as mayor (not just councillor) in 
the new authority, or not; or secondly, as a function not of who 
takes home the mayoralty but of the share of local politicians 
re-elected in the new authority (i.e. mayors and councillors re-
elected as either)26. However, both are calculated in the same 
way, as the choice of the one or the other merely affects 
whether the structure of the independent variable is 
dichotomous (the mayoral measure) as Ri = {0, 1} = {No, 
                                      
25
 Drawing on classic concepts from budgeting theory, we can say that 
re-elected politicians take on the role of budgetary guardians against 
expenditures, while the not re-elected ones are advocates for 
expenditures (for example, see Brunsson, 1989) 
26
 Note that neither measure denotes a shift in the level of analysis from 
local authorities to individual councillors. 
 A third possible measure could draw on the extensive literature on 
coalitional theory (#Riker) which would have a decidedly less linear 
take on the consumption of liquidity than the second measure. This third 
possibility will be introduced in the course of the analysis as an 
alternative to the others. 
 It might be appropriate here for a moment to delve into why the 
mayoralty might have a significant impact on local authorities’ financial 
behaviour: generally speaking, mayors (often referred to as ‘city kings’ 
by the political punditry) are in a formidable position in Danish local 
politics for several reasons: most importantly, mayors are near-
impossible to remove from office in between elections (Christensen & 
Espersen, 1983) in all but the most exceptional circumstances cf. § 7, 
subsection 2, and § 66 of the Communal Administration Act. The 
problematic aspects of this near-political immunity became all too clear 
in the spring of 2002 with the case of one of the more controversial 
mayors in Denmark: Peter Brixtofte. 
 Also, the mayor is often the only local politician employed full time 
which in several ways gives him or her advantages over the remaining 
town or county councillors (#). 
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Yes}, or continuous (the councillor measure). The expected 
consumption of liquidity is calculated as 
 ( )i i i i i i i iC R P R A D= δ = δ −  (6.4). 
Again, amalgamation, δi, is included in the equation because 
the argument only applies to the amalgamating authorities, δi = 
1, i.e. 
( ) ( )i i i i i i i i i i i iC 1 R P 1 R A D C R P R A D .= ⋅ = ⋅ − ⇔ = = −   
Conversely, the expected consumption of liquidity in the 
unaffected authorities, δi = 0, is still zero: 
( )i i i i i i iC 0 R P 0 R A D C 0.= ⋅ = ⋅ − ⇔ =  
Notice that the mayoral measure amounts to an expectation 
either of a liquidity consumption of nil (if the mayor has not 
been re-elected as mayor of the new authority) or as much as 
possible within the imposed restrictions (if s/he is re-elected). 
On the other hand, the councillor measure amounts to a linear 
(and assumed perfectly proportional) expectation reflecting the 
share of re-elected councillors; for example, if half of the 
councillors are re-elected to a new authority’s council, then the 
expectation is that haft of the liquidity in their old authority is 
consumed. 
As previously, this model is bivariat with a unidirectional, 
positive causal connection between consumption of liquidity, 
the dependent variable, and re-election, the independent; see 
Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Consumption of Liquidity and Re-election 
Expressed in words, the expectation is that 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): for the fiscal year of 2006, the 
consumption of liquidity in the amalgamating local authorities 
is positively related to re-election in the new authorities’ 
councils – either defined dichotomously as who takes home 
Page 39 
the mayoralty or continuously as the share of re-elected 
councillors. 
Notice that the variation in the dependent variable, our 
measuring rod, isn’t between the amalgamating and unaffected 
authorities but instead between the authorities in the former 
group. 
 This leads us to consider effects other than those of 
individuals, namely group effects. The potential vices and 
virtues of collective action are well-known and –documented in 
political science, spanning a large array of otherwise widely 
differing fields, and I now turn to these kinds of effects. 
5.4 THE CONUNDRUM OF RATIONAL MAN AND 
IRRATIONAL SOCIETY: ENTER GROUP EFFECTS 
Future content: this chapter will draw on the literature on 
collective action theory, as formulated by Mancur Olson, and 
introduce group effects into the chain of reasoning. The 
collective action problem with regards to resource allocation is 
to secure the new authorities a sound financial standing at their 
moment of (re-)birth, i.e. from 01.01.2007. Olson’s classical 
argument on group size is elaborated and defined as the number 
of amalgamating authorities in each new authority. This leads 
to an expectation of a positive causal connection between group 
size and consumption of liquidity. This is the first group effect. 
However, group asymmetry is, according to Olson, a 
possible solution to the collective action problem – 
(a)symmetry measured as the dispersion among the 
amalgamating authorities’ possible consumptions, Pi, calculated 
on page 34). This is the second group effect that leads to a 
more optimistic expectation about the liquidity consumption if 
the dispersion in possible consumptions is sufficiently large 
among the amalgamating authorities. 
Another possible solution to the collective action problem 
is that of institutional design which is the subject of the next 
chapter. 
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This concludes the theoretical deliberations as for what 
can be expected of the Pinocchios’ behaviour, both their 
deliberate, individual actions and the effects that collective 
action in itself can have. However, as noted in Chapter 5.1 (on 
page 30), the restrictions imposed in the local authorities in 
connection with the current local government reform, also 
entailed an institutional change. As we shall see in the 
following chapter, this processual change can be expected to 
have a significant impact on the outcome of the local 
authorities’ behaviour, although their individual actions might 
for the better part remain the same27. 
5.5 BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING YOU, PINOCCHIO: 
COMMUNAL BICAMERALISM 
”The Constitution of 1953 abolished the 
[Danish] bicameral system… In Germany, the 
bicameral system’s double principle of 
representation is secured constitutionally. In 
Denmark, it was [de facto] reinstated with the 
local government reform in 1970”, 
(freely translated from Christensen, 1998). 
Future content: I have included two pages on the processual 
changes that the government’s restrictions entail. As elaborated 
here, a processual change occurs for the fiscal year of 2006 
which introduces an element of bicameralism in each of the 
amalgamating, local authorities – and which hinges on the 
pivotal issue from Chapter 5.3, namely political re-election. As 
for the hypothesized behaviour of the local authorities, the 
introduction of this bicameral element leads to an expectation 
that a large subset of the amalgamating authorities might try to 
                                      
27
 Also, the heretofore said can to a great extent also account for what 
we would expect of the local authorities’ behaviour in connection with 
the first local government reform in 1970 – save the matters pertaining 
to restrictions on their behaviour, of course. However, this is not true of 
the considerations in the next chapter. 
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get away with uneconomical conduct, but that behaviour is 
countered by the respective integration and preparation 
committees. The point is that politicians not re-elected have the 
incentive for uneconomical conduct but not the means (i.e. the 
political power) – and vice versa for the politicians that are re-
elected. 
Family additions are typically joyous occasions which, on the 
face of it, should make the Pinocchios ecstatic about the second 
local government reform; for they have been blessed with a 
bigger brother, albeit only temporarily for the fiscal year of 
2006. But perhaps there is, in Shakespeare’s words, something 
rotten in the state of Denmark – or at least that might well be 
the local authorities’ take on the arrival of their new sibling. As 
this chapter will elaborate, the central powers at be have for 
2006 taken to the sport of heresthetics and tinkered not only 
with the scope of the Pinocchios’ financial autonomy, as dealt 
with earlier in Chapter 5.1 (on page 27ff); no, Geppetto has 
also tinkered with the very institutional design that binds and 
confines the local authorities – this by decentralizing his 
paternalistic (though arguably well-founded) worrying for the 
wellbeing of his wooden son(s). The following is therefore an 
extension on the aforementioned chapter which elucidated the 
restrictions imposed on the local authorities; but nothing was 
here said on the processual side of Geppetto’s precautionary 
measures – measures that now show their almost Orwellian 
proportions (#Orwell, 1984). 
As Christensen and several others have noted, Denmark 
might formally have abandoned bicameralism in 1953 but it 
was de facto reinstated with the local government reform in 
1970 (see Blom-Hansen, 2002; and Christiansen, 2000). This 
very much has to do with the tendency for minority 
governments in Denmark that, given the lack of clear 
parliamentary majorities, have bolstered themselves by 
involving the local authorities’ organizations as a de facto first 
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chamber. The second local government reform has likewise 
introduced an additional bicameral system, now at municipal 
and county level, albeit only temporarily for the fiscal year of 
2006. This means that the amalgamating (!) Pinocchios’ 
traditional ‘unicameralism’, the town and county councils’ 
local sovereignty, is circumscribed for 2006 by ‘bigger 
brothers’ in the form of municipal integration and county 
preparation committees – and in some cases also by the 
Ministry of the Interior and Health (henceforth abbreviated 
MIH). The former is thus reduced to a first chamber with the 
latter acting as powerful de jure second chambers. This 
‘strategizing in the large’ by Geppetto was laid down in the 
agreement on the local government reform: 
“In order to ensure proper preparation of the merger of 
municipalities, the district councils elected in the merged 
municipalities as a result of the local government election on 
15 November 2005 will act as integration committees in 
2006… The same principles apply to the new regions. Here, 
the newly elected regional councils will act as preparation 
committees in 2006 with the responsibility of preparing 
establishment of the new regions”, 
(Indenrigs- og Sundhedsministeriet, 2006a; cursive added). 
The bicameral system thus functions by pitting some of the 
Pinocchios up against the remaining ones, although the 
dividing line actually isn’t found between authorities, but rather 
within each of them. We are here touching on the pivotal issue 
last spoken of in Chapter 5.3, namely political re-election. 
Sorry for the abrupt ending of this chapter, but this is as far as I 
could get before the paper’s deadline. 
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